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WHAT CONSTITUTES "BENEFITS" FOR URBAN
DRAINAGE PROJECTS
By W. JOSEPH SHOEMAKER*
A tunnel which, though serving no useful purpose as an isolated
transportation unit, is intended to furnish an avenue or highway to
be leased to public transportation agencies, is a public improvement
for a public use, for which taxes may be imposed.'
INTRODUCTION
Colorado has a history of finding legal justification for public
improvements as the holding above witnesses. Milheim v. Moffat
Tunnel Improvement District, a famous Colorado case, involved
an even more famous engineering feat, that of boring a railroad
tunnel, with provisions for a 108-inch water pipe, through the
Rocky Mountains. That case has set a precedent upon which
proponents of urban drainage projects may also rely. In order to
use the Milheim precedent to advocate such a cause, however, it
is important to understand the distinction between assessing
property for general benefits which accrue to the community at
large as contrasted with assessing property for the special benefits
which must accrue directly and solely to the owner of the land in
question and not to others. Milheim approved of the former
method of assessing, although most of its language related to the
special benefits the property owners would receive.
Most public improvements, including urban drainage pro-
jects, are financed with revenues obtained from taxes paid by the
public.2 Drainage improvements in rural areas have long been
financed by establishing drainage districts3 which assess rural
lands for the cost of building and maintaining drainage facilities,
while urban areas have been given authority to use local improve-
ment and special improvement districts to build drainage works.4
* Partner, Shoemaker and Wham, Denver, Colorado; B.S., 1947, United States
Naval Academy; J.D., 1956, University of Iowa.
' See Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 262 U.S. 710 (1923), aff'g 72
Colo. 268, 211 P. 649 (1922).
1 Private funds sometimes are received. User fees are becoming more popular as a
means of financing public projects, e.g., airport facilities, sewage treatment works, turn-
pikes, water works, because such fees relate to services received as opposed to the value
of one's property.
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-1-1 (1963).
Cow. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-2-1 (1963): "It shall be lawful ... to construct any of
the local improvements mentioned in this article and to assess the cost thereof. . . upon
the property especially benefited by such improvements." Further, "Such improvements
may also consist of the construction of sewers .... " id. § 89-2-2(1)(a) (1963).
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In local improvement districts, the property owners vote on the
issue of whether their property should be taxed to pay for the
improvements. Whether their property will be generally benefited
to the extent of the additional taxes is the determinative issue.
In special improvement districts, the property owners are as-
sessed in relation to the special benefits bestowed upon their
property by the construction of the improvement. The assessing
government eventually has the burden of showing these benefits.
In the application of user fees toward the construction of
urban drainage projects, the users are entitled to question
whether the fee paid is commensurate with the cost of the facility
and the benefits received from the use of such facility. Any re-
sponsible governmental builder will clearly delineate the benefits
to be received by his constituents from proposed drainage projects
before adding to the taxation burden of those same constituents
the amount necessary to derive revenues to pay for the drainage
projects. Therefore, whether the urban drainage project is of
general benefit or special benefit, someone in government-
whether administrative, legislative, or both-has to know what
the judicial branch ultimately may hold to be a legal benefit for
which taxpayers may be taxed.5 One objective of this article is
to provide some background on what courts may decide on urban
drainage projects as to special versus general benefits.
Drainage projects have had minimal success in competition
with other public improvements (such as housing, transportation,
etc.) because the benefits of drainage projects have been narrowly
construed in those cases involving special improvement districts
as a taxing mechanism, in which special benefits have to be
proved. The main undertaking of this article is to demonstrate
that the narrow special benefit viewpoint is to be distinguished
from the general benefit definition so that public builders of
urban drainage projects may have the justification needed to
merit their use of taxpayers' dollars. Additionally, the legal
meaning of benefits as interpreted by the courts in different fac-
tual settings will be examined.
I. SPECIAL BENEFITS
The commonplace problem of surface water drainage has been
around for so long that some municipal officials have ignored the
Legislation is needed in most jurisdictions to define "benefit"; see proposal pre-
sented in CONCLUSION infra.
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flood and health hazards which outmoded drainage systems pose to
our growing cities.'
When the above statement was made in 1968 by this author,
it was a reflection of the practical frustration inherent in trying
to use the special improvement district as a funding mechanism
for drainage improvements.' The legal hurdles that have devel-
oped over the years in special assessment cases have been enough
to discourage the most energetic public works official from ever
attempting to solve drainage problems. A brief review of this
method of financing special drainage improvements will show
that the narrow legal interpretation of benefits relates to the
method of financing, not to the need for urban drainage improve-
ments.
Most statutory enactments which relate to the authority of
local governments to construct drainage improvements follow
this general form:
The City and County shall have the power to contract for and make
local improvements, to assess the cost thereof wholly or in part upon
the property especially benefited .. .
[and] the cost shall be assessed in proportion to the benefits
received.'
This method of financing an improvement follows the histor-
ical language contained in the statutory authorization" allowing
farmers to join together in a district to drain their lands by tiling,
building drainage channels, or deepening existing natural water-
ways. Property owners pay the cost of such projects by assessing
a mill levy against properties in the district commensurate to
benefits received.
I Editorial preface to Shoemaker, An Engineering-Legal Solution to Urban Drainage
Problems, 45 DENVER L.J. 381 (1968).
Id. Since that article was published, and to a great extent because of the article,
the Colorado Legislature in 1969 provided for the establishment in the Denver metropoli-
tan area (Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Denver, Douglas, and Jefferson Counties) of the
Urban Drainage and Flood Control District with a mill levy authority of one-tenth mill
for planning purposes and authority to seek 2 mills for construction of projects. CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 89-21-22(4) (Supp. 1969), as amended, § 89-21-22(4) (Supp. 1971). In 1973,
the Colorado Legislature added an additional authorization to the Board of four-tenths
mill for construction of drainage and flood control improvements. Ch. 286, § 1, [1973]
Colo. Sess. Laws 996.
' CrrY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLO., CHARTER § A2.4.
Id. at A2.6.
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-4-1(1) (1963): "The tracts of land which will receive
most and about equal benefits shall be marked one hundred, and such as are adjudged to
receive less benefits shall be marked with a less number denoting its per cent of benefit."
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It is noteworthy that nowhere in the entire 18 sections of the
Colorado statute" is the word benefits defined. This legislative
failure to define benefits has delegated the duty to the courts. The
cases do not directly define benefits, but rather tell what benefits
are not. This narrow negative interpretation of benefit legislation
discourages municipal officials interested in building drainage
improvements. What follows is the putting into perspective of
what appears to be the narrow meaning of benefits in special
assessment cases. In each case a particular property taxpayer, not
the general public, brought the appeal based on the owner's con-
tention that his property was not specially benefited, essentially
meaning that it received no more benefit than anyone else's prop-
erty. All of the following factual situations are matched against
the special improvement financing theory that the basis of the
right to levy an assessment for an improvement is the particular
benefit received by the property charged. 2
A landmark case is Ferguson v. Borough of Stamford, 3 where
the court stated that improvements may not be assessed upon
those benefited only as members of the community at large, nor
may they be assessed to an amount greater than the amount of
benefits conferred. Like all other taxation, improvements should
be apportioned, as far as possible, equitably among all who are
similarly interested. Stated another way, a general benefit alone
will not support a special assessment to help pay the cost of a
drainage project. There must be a special benefit to the specific
property to be charged which increases its value, relieves it from
a burden, or adapts it to a superior or more profitable use. 4
Another case defining the elements of special benefit with
greater certainty is Peterson v. Thurston, ' where it was declared
proper to consider whether a drain would make land more valua-
ble for tillage, or more desirable as a residence, or more valuable
in the general market, the final test being the influence of the
proposed improvement on the market value of the property.
In Hoepner v. Yellow Medicine County," a county in Minne-
sota proposed to convert part of a natural waterway into a public
drainage ditch and outlet. The plaintiff's land was separated
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-4-1 (1963).
2 25 AM. JuR. 2d Drains and Drainage Districts § 45 (1966).
13 60 Conn. 432, 22 A. 782 (1891).
4 25 AM. JuN. 2d Drains and Drainage Districts § 46 (1966).
161 Neb. 758, 74 N.W.2d 528 (1956).
241 Minn. 6, 62 N.W.2d 80 (1954).
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from the natural waterway by about 1,000 feet, and the land had
some sloughs, the largest of which drained through a private open
ditch across a neighbor's land to the natural watercourse. The
Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
[The] question presented . . .is whether a landowner as a matter
of law receives assessable drainage benefits in a drainage improv-
ment proceeding . . . solely by reason of the fact that the surface
water on his land is drained into the public ditch involved even
though he had a right to use, in its natural condition, the outlet
which is to be the public ditch and even though there is no showing
that the public ditch offers a better outlet.7
The county contended that the deepening of the creek would
facilitate tiling of plaintiffs land and give an advantage of sub-
surface drainage. Plaintiff contended that the open ditch pres-
ently used adequately drained the subsurface; and, in fact, that
the open ditch had a greater capacity for drainage than any tile
which could be installed. The county further contended that
plaintiff's outlet to the natural water course was only based on
the oral permission given by the neighbor and that the public
improvement would make the outlet more accessible. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court found the plaintiff not to be specially bene-
fited and based its finding on the language of the statute in-
volved: 8 "L]ands may be assessed for benefits when the con-
struction of the drainage system 'Makes an outlet more accessi-
ble, or otherwise directly benefits such lands or properties.' ",1
The court held neither to be the case here.
In Cirasella v. Village of South Orange,20 the question was
raised whether or not a storm-sewer improvement provided a pe-
culiar benefit to the plaintiffs property which was not contiguous
to the storm-sewer improvement and was not contiguous to any
pipe or pipes carrying surface drainage into the storm-sewer. The
storm-sewer improvement had been built to carry the surface
runoff from the lands of plaintiff and others. The New Jersey
court, in affirming a lower court ruling that plaintiff's lands were
not benefited, stated:
Assessments as distinguished from other kinds of taxation, are those
special and local impositions upon the property in the immediate
vicinity of municipal improvements, which are necessary to pay for
the improvement, and are laid with reference to the special benefit
'7 Id. at 9, 62 N.W.2d at 83.
" MINN. STAT. § 106.151 (1971).
" Hoepner v. Yellow Medicine County, 241 Minn. 6, 10, 62 N.W.2d 80, 84 (1954).
57 N.J. Super. 522, 155 A.2d 134 (1959).
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which the property is supposed to have derived therefrom .... The
foundation of the power to lay a special assessment or a special tax
for a local improvement of any character, whether it be opening,
improving or paving a street or sidewalk or constructing a sewer, or
cleaning or sprinkling a street, is the benefit which the object of the
assessment or tax confers on the owner of the abutting property, or
the owners of property in the assessment of special taxation dis-
trict, which is different from the general benefit which the owners
enjoy in common with the other inhabitants or citizens of the munic-
ipal corporation. Accordingly, it is now well settled in most jurisdic-
tions that adjacent property may be specially assessed to defray, in
whole or in part, the cost of local improvements by which such
property is especially benefited. That doctrine, as stated, is based
for its final reason on enhancement of values. That is to say, the
whole theory of local taxation or assessments is that the improve-
ments for which they are levied afford a remuneration in the way of
benefits. Whether the property has been specially benefited by an
improvement is generally regarded a question of fact, depending on
the circumstances in each case, for the determination of the proper
tribunal. The broad question is whether the general value of the
property has been enhanced, not whether its present owner receives
advantage.2 '
In Frank v. Renville County,22 another Minnesota case, the
factual dispute was set forth in some detail and illustrates in
words the historical conflict in most special assessment drainage
cases. The county constructed a drainage ditch across the plain-
tiff's land and determined that benefits accrued to the land.
1Id. at 525, 155 A.2d at 137 citing In re Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 18 N.J. Super.
357, 363, 87 A.2d 344, 346 (App. Div. 1952). For purposes of determining whether property
will be benefited by creation of a parking district, "[blenefit is usually considered as
tending to reflect enhancement in the market value of property . . . . Local zoning ordi-
nances are matters which help determine market values . Jeffery v. City of Salinas,
232 Cal. App. 2d 29, 37, 42 Cal. Rptr. 486, 493 (1965).
When the owner of a lot is taxed for municipal improvements, the benefit is not the
benefit to the public at large but to the owner of the lot. The phrases benefits and
increased value are interchangeable terms since, where tax is apportioned according to the
increased value of a lot, they are the same thing as the value of the benefit which the owner
receives from the improvement. Garret v. City of St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505, 511, 69 Am. Dec.
475, 478 (1857).
Benefit is the increment of value to land affected by improvement and represents the
difference between market value of land before improvement and immediately after im-
provement. Assessments for improvements must be such special, pecuniary benefits as
result to a particular landowner by reason of his ownership of land affected, as distin-
guished from general benefits to the public. Maywood Land Co. v. Rochelle Park T., 13
N.J. Misc. 841, 181 A. 696 (1935).
The terms "benefits" and "to be benefited," as used in an act providing for organiza-
tion of flood control districts, mean that a landowner has received, or will receive, by
reason of improvement, an increase in market value of his property. Weyerhaeuser Timber
Co. v. Banker, 186 Wash. 332, 342, 58 P.2d 285, 289 (1936).
242 Minn. 172, 64 N.W.2d 750 (1954).
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Damages to the plaintiff's land were also established and the
plaintiff appealed both counts, that benefits were assessed too
high, and damages too low. The plaintiff's position was that a
200-acre farm which produced an average annual income of
$12,500 could not be benefited to the extent of $3,000 by any
drainage system when only 3 or 4 acres of crop on his land was
lost in 2 out of 5 years because of inadequate drainage. He further
claimed his land was substantially and materially damaged by
construction of a 40-foot ditch across his land.
The county contended the improvement would necessitate
less maintenance than plaintiff's tile system; result in water mov-
ing more rapidly from the tract; and water would be cleared from
several acres where it was covered most of the time. Plaintiff
further contended that the creation of the banks (caused by in-
creasing the depth of the ditch from 8 to 10 feet), the cost of a
bridge crossing over the ditch, and resulting inconveniences to his
farming operations were damages for which he should be compen-
sated. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the lower court
and remanded the case for a new trial on both issues: The benefits
assessed to the plaintiff and the damages awarded to him.
Colorado's Supreme Court has spoken decisively and consis-
tently on the same issue.23 In Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v.
City & County of Denver,24 a sanitary sewer special improvement
district case, the court found support for special assessments
under the theory that the property against which they are levied
derives some special, immediate, and peculiar benefit by reason
of the improvement, in addition to, and different from that en-
joyed by other property in the community outside of the district
in which the improvement is made. That is, the local improve-
ment peculiarly enhances the value of the property against which
the assessment is levied, to an amount equal to, if not in excess
of, the amount of the special assessment.
In Hildreth v. City of Longmont,"5 upholding a district court
ruling that property was benefited, the Colorado Supreme Court
stated:
Generally speaking, only such benefits are to be assessed as it is
Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 72 Colo. 268, 211 P. 649 (1922).
Legal practitioners have questioned, however, whether the landmark case of Milheim is a
special benefit case or general benefit case, or whether, because of the novelty of the
subject matter as opposed to a sewer or street improvement case, the court came to its
conclusions using both special benefit and general benefit language.
24 89 Colo. 309, 313, 2 P.2d 238, 239 (1931).
21 47 Colo. 79, 105 P. 107 (1909).
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reasonably apparent the property will receive other than the general
benefit to the community, and nothing is to be considered a benefit
which does not enhance the value of the property. Vacant lots may
have no present use for a sewerage system; but it adds to their value
by giving them a sanitary advantage which renders them salable at
a price which otherwise they could not command, because of their
desirability . . . .
Town of Fort Lupton v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." was an
action by the railroad to enjoin the city of Fort Lupton from
assessing railroad property for street and curb improvement. The
railroad pointed out that the street improvement provided no
additional access for its customer traffic, no increase in revenues
to the railroad, and no physical benefit to the railroad's property.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's finding
that no benefit inured to the railroad despite the city's contention
that a declaration of benefits by the city council shall be prima
facie evidence of the fact that the property assessed is benefited
in the amount of the assessments.2 1
It should be apparent at this point that some differences
exist among the various definitions of special benefits, depending
upon whether urban or rural land is involved. The above cases are
in general agreement that urban land is specially benefited if its
market value is increased by the installation of storm or sanitary
sewers. Thus, even vacant urban land may be specially benefited
by such improvements, as its market value and salability in-
crease. It should be noted that the increase in value is a benefit
which may never be converted to cash by a landowner if he never
sells or transfers his land, and thus may never be realized. In the
case of a sanitary sewer, the actual use thereof is a benefit tangi-
ble enough to justify assessment.
When rural land is involved, the above cases seem to imply
that a present special benefit is necessary. Rural land often seems
to require some agriculturally-related benefit, such as drainage of
flooded land for use as crop land, or increasing runoff to promote
earlier planting. These benefits are often balanced against cost
26 Id. at 86, 105 P. at 114 (emphasis added).
11 156 Colo. 352, 399 P.2d 248 (1965). See also District 50 Metropolitan Recreation
Dist. v. Burnside, 167 Colo. 425, 448 P.2d 788 (1968). In Burnside, the Colorado Supreme
Court upheld a statute which excluded railroad property from levy for recreational district
purposes. The court stated: "The section is a legislative declaration of what is obvious -
that the property excluded would not benefit from, or have any use for, playgrounds, golf
courses and swimming pools." Id. at 431, 448 P.2d at 791. It would be helpful if the
legislature were to set forth what constitutes benefits, or criteria for public officials to use.
28 Id. at 354, 399 P.2d at 249.
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and inconvenience to the rural land owner. Increase in land value
may also be a consideration in assessing rural drainage projects.
Special benefits, then, have at least one common denomina-
tor in economic value. If a monetary benefit can be shown to have
accrued to a landowner by reason of an improvement (increased
market value, increased crop production, etc.), then special as-
sessment becomes more feasible. Difficulties may arise where no
value can be assigned to an improvement by a landowner, such
as the drainage of land used as a refuse dump by the owner.
In all cases where the special improvement assessment has
been upheld, the burden was on the assessing government to show
that the improvement had a unique and distinguishable benefit
to the particular land owner assessed, apart from and beyond
benefit to the public at large.
II. GENERAL BENEFITS
It would be most helpful to builders of urban drainage im-
provements if legislative bodies defined potential types of bene-
fits from urban drainage projects, leaving exact dollar amounts
to the facts of each proposed improvement. Thus, if a special
improvement district were determined the best method of financ-
ing the improvement, the types of benefits would have to be
evaluated with respect to each piece of property assessed. On the
other hand, if property were to be assessed generally for the cost
of the improvement, the types of benefits would only have to be
evaluated for the total area covered by the district to answer the
general question of whether benefits equalled or exceeded the cost
of the improvement.
There are several resources to assist legislators in drafting
types of benefits. Benefit has been defined as "[a]dvantage;
profit; fruit; privilege," and also as:
[a] contribution to prosperity; whatever adds value to property;
advantage; profit; whatever promotes our prosperity, happiness, or
enhances the value of our property rights, or rights as citizens, as
contradistinguished from what is injurious.3
Moreover,
"[blenefit" is not limited to pecuniary gains, nor to any particular
kind of advantage; it refers to what is advantageous, whatever pro-
motes prosperity or happiness, what enhances the value of the prop-
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 200 (4th ed. 1951).
BALLENTINF's LAW DICTIONARY 131 (3d ed. 1969). See National Surety Co. v. Jarret,
95 W. Va. 420, 121 S.E. 291 (1924) for a testamentary definition of benefit.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
erty or rights of citizens as contradistinguished from what is inju-
rious.3
Benefit has also been defined in general terms in cases. The
leading Colorado case of Milheim goes into some detail as to what
constitutes a benefit.3 A number of plaintiffs brought suit to
enjoin the defendants from proceeding under a statute creating a
tunnel improvement district, the ground of the action being that
plaintiffs' property would be burdened by an illegal tax. Issues of
law and fact were presented as to the benefit to the property
subject to assessment. The District Court of Jefferson County
heard evidence upon the question of benefits and found for the
defendants. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed.
The Tunnel Improvement District in Milheim was created
for the construction of a transportation tunnel through the conti-
nental divide for transportation between the western and eastern
portions of the state. Properties in nine counties were to be as-
sessed. One of the contentions of the plaintiffs was that the im-
provement was not for public use. The Colorado Supreme Court
stated:
[A] use may be public though not many persons may enjoy it. This
is well established, the requirement being that the improvement be
open to use by all persons who have need of it.
If the business proposed to be carried on is essentially for
public benefit and advantage, then the use is public. In determin-
ing a public use, the criteria followed by the court consisted of (a)
the physical conditions of the country; (b) the needs of a com-
munity; (c) the character of the benefit which a projected im-
provement may confer upon a locality; and (d) the necessities for
such improvement in the development of the resources of a
state. 4
It was further contended by the plaintiffs that the benefits
were unequal. The court stated: "The law does not require that
the benefits should be exactly equal. ' 35 The plaintiffs further
objected on the grounds that no special benefits accrued to the
property owners in Jefferson County because of the tfinnel. The
court noted:
[Tlhe tunnel will make possible the delivery of coal inf Denver at a
3 A. Booth & Co. v. Weigand, 30 Utah 135, 83 P. 734 (1906).
' Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 72 Colo. 268, 211 P. 649 (1922).
Id. at 270, 211 P. at 651.
3, Id. citing Tanner v. Treasury Tunnel, Mining & Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 596,
83 P. 464, 465 (1906).
1 Id. at 273, 211 P. at 653.
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considerably lower freight rate, and hence make it probable that the
growth and prosperity of the city will be materially promoted. That
being true, the lands in Jefferson County within this district will
assuredly increase in value with the growth of Denver.3
A concurring opinion in Milheim further observed that:
The area of the district is one which is cut off from intercourse with
the rest of the world for many weeks in the year . . . .The lack of
easy communication, and, for some periods during the year, of any
communication at all, with other parts of the state, interrupts and
jeopardizes commercial intercourse of all kinds. Products from this
vast and fertile territory cannot be marketed with any degree of
assurance. The proposed improvement is needed and will benefit the




The broad interpretation of benefit by the Colorado Supreme
Court lends credence to a possible effort by the Colorado Legisla-
ture to define benefit.
Courts in other jurisdictions have also expanded upon the
meaning of benefits for purposes of justifying taxation of property
to defray the costs of improvements. In a recent Florida case
involving the ecological impact of a proposed project, Seadade
Industries v. Florida Power & Light Co., 38 it was held that since
the constitution declared the policy of the State as to natural
resources, the protection of resources is an appropriate matter for
consideration in condemnation cases. In Seadade, the plaintiff
maintained that the proposed canal to carry spent cooling water
from a generating plant to the body of water into which it was to
be discharged, was unnecessary because the spent water would
harm the permanent body of water. The Florida Supreme Court
found that the defendant successfully showed that the discharge
would be acceptable and no irreparable harm would result. The
type of benefit under consideration related to preservation of a
permanent body of water.
A case distinguishing assessment for benefits to the general
public from assessments to particular property not specially ben-
efited, is Crampton v. City of Royal Oak.39 Royal Oak had created
a special assessment district in a downtown area for development
of pedestrian malls and plazas, among other improvements.
Plaintiffs contended their property would not be "specially bene-
Id. at 278, 211 P. at 654.
'7 Id. at 290-91, 211 P. at 658.
245 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971).
362 Mich. 503, 108 N.W.2d 16 (1961).
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fited" and that the city's method of assessing, i.e., one part on
assessed value of the land for general tax purposes and the second
part based on closeness or remoteness and square footage of each
parcel, was in error.
The Michigan Supreme Court in Crampton reversed a lower
court decision which had upheld the assessor's method. In declar-
ing that special assessments must be based on special benefits to
particular parcels of property and not on assessed valuation, the
court referred to an earlier Michigan decision, Grand Rapids
School Furniture Co. v. City of Grand Rapids,4 in which it was
stated that assessors "are simply to apportion a fixed amount, not
with reference to values alone, but also with reference to needs,
necessities, and advantages."4' The Michigan Supreme Court
also reaffirmed an earlier principle that "future probable advan-
tages may be considered in assessing benefits, and that incidental
benefits may be taken into account as well as those directly re-
ceived by the land."4 The court further stated:
The improvement here involved is not primarily one for the protec-
tion of property but is designed to benefit the city as a whole, and
the property within the assessment district specially, by promoting
the use and enjoyment thereof and enhancing its value....
In a case of this nature, consideration must be given to the
purpose to be attained by the public improvement sought.43
In this case, the assessment was set aside by the court and the
municipality was given the rig&t to substitute a new assessment
based on benefits received by each parcel of land within the as-
sessment district.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Black observed that what could
be benefits for some in the assessment district could be detrimental
for others in the district. He quoted from the city's brief as follows:
It takes no great imagination to see that an area easily accessible to
pedestrian and motorist alike in safety, free from fast moving
through traffic and congested local traffic with its attendant noise,
fumes, and general commotion, systematically and conveniently
planned and laid out, generously interspersed with large free park-
ing areas, and beautified with landscaping and decorative malls and
plazas, is to be preferred far and away over its opposite counter-
part.
44
10 92 Mich. 564, 52 N.W. 1028 (1892).
Id. at 569, 52 N.W. at 1029.
42 362 Mich. at 522, 108 N.W.2d at 24.
Id. at 523, 108 N.W.2d at 25-26.
14 Id. at 532, 108 N.W.2d at 29.
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Justice Black then went on to agree with these benefits as
related to some property owners, but pointed out that the di-
verted traffic, fumes and noise could be a detriment to others:
Such a project benefits, yes. The shopper is convenienced and at-
tracted by comfortable ways of spending money, and the adjacent
places of business do more business. But that business, so attracted,
must be taken from other less attractive spots. Such is Confucius'
law of competition. It affords no basis for compulsive contribution
of those adversely affected, or at least those who receive no like
benefit. 5
This case is particularly important because it establishes
types of benefits that may be present. The special assessments
were set aside as a mechanism for financing the proposed im-
provement because there was inadequate evidence to support the
types of benefits as related to specific parcels.
Health and sanitation improvements have also been cited by
several courts as a type of benefit for assessing lands for drainage
improvements. 6 As related to this type of benefit, the cases seem
to indicate that even though it is impossible under the circum-
stances to ascertain the exact monetary benefit resulting directly
to land from an urban drainage project relieving a health and
sanitation problem, the land may nevertheless be subject to as-
sessment on the basis of the improvement to health and sanita-
tion.
I1. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
"[Tihe Legislature is . . . invested with a wide discretion
[in] imposing a tax . .I.'.- A state legislature, in the
absence of any constitutional restriction, may fix the basis of
assessment or taxation, and whenever it does so, such method
must be followed to the exclusion of any other. As was noted
previously,49 the Colorado statutes use the word benefits, but
nowhere do the statutes define the term.5° Since the legislature
has seen fit to relate assessments and taxation to benefits, specifi-
45 Id. at 533-34, 108 N.W.2d at 30.
,1 Garden of Eden Drainage Dist. v. Bartlett Trust Co., 330 Mo. 554, 562, 50 S.W.2d
627, 631 (1932): "What is termed hill land, when contiguous to or surrounded by swamp-
land, may be greatly benefited by draining such disease producing swamps, or the means
of ingress and egress to and from such lands. ... See also Dean v. Wilson, 267 Mo.
268, 183 S.W. 611 (1916).
'7 Bedford v. Johnson, 102 Colo. 203, 210, 78 P.2d 373, 377 (1938).
" Clark v. City of Royal Oak, 325 Mich. 298, 38 N.W.2d 413, cert. denied, 338 U.S.
890 (1949).
,' See text accompanying note 11 supra.
5' No statutory definition of benefit in other jurisdictions has been discovered.
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cally as related to drainage projects, the next step should be the
establishment of criteria for determining what constitutes types
of benefits.
The engineers and planners who are working with urban
drainage projects can provide valuable assistance to the legisla-
ture in defining benefits from drainage improvements by outlin-
ing the particular benefits inherent in such projects.
CONCLUSION
The need for adequate urban drainage and flood control sys-
tems in metropolitan areas is clear. However, implementation of
such systems is being hindered by hesitancy of local officials to
act in light of the statutory requirement that assessments be
made according to benefits received, while the meaning of
benefits remains undefined. The following proposed statutory
definition of benefit would help to clarify the situation, and its
enactment would be a positive step toward encouraging needed
urban drainage improvements.
The term benefit, for the purpose of assessing a particular
property within a drainage district (or special improvement dis-
trict), may include any one or more of the following:
a. Any increase in the market value of the property;
b. The provision for accepting the burden from specific property
for discharging surface water onto servient property in a manner or
quantity greater than would naturally flow because the dominant
owner made some of his property impermeable;
c. Any adaptability of property to a superior or more profitable
use;
d. Any alleviation of health and sanitation hazards accruing to
particular property or of public property in the district if the provi-
sion of health and sanitation is paid for wholly or partially out of
funds derived from taxation of property owners of the district;
e. Any reduction in the maintenance costs of particular property
or of public property in the district if the maintenance of the public
property is paid for wholly or partially out of funds derived from
taxation of property owners of the district;
f. Any increase in convenience or reduction in inconvenience
accruing to particular property owners, including the facilitation of
access to and travel over streets, roads, and highways;
g. Aesthetic, ecological or recreational improvements accruing to
particular property owners as a direct result of the drainage im-
provement.
h. The dollar value or values of any one or more of the above a.
through g. accruing to a specific parcel of property or the total prop-
erty of a taxing entity shall be determined as related to the cost of
the specific improvement.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the fact
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that lands included in a drainage district will receive no direct
benefit is not per se enough to exempt them from assessment."
erefore, assessment according to the above types of benefit is well
within judicial limits.52 The legislature should take the necessary
action to enact such a provision defining types of benefits. It is a
broader definition than most state courts have followed and is a
step toward encouraging the construction of needed urban drain-
age improvements, while at the same time affording protection to
property to be assessed from irresponsible charges.
Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Sacramento Drainage Dist., 256 U.S. 129 (1921).
' See also Morton Salt Co. v. City of S. Hutchison, 159 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1947);
Barten v. Turkey Creek Joint Dist., 200 Kan. 489, 438 P.2d 732 (1968); Curtis v. Louisville
& Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 311 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1958).

